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ABSTRACT: Since 1920 the thrust of German law on workplace codetermination has 
changed on a number of occasions. In the latest swing of the legislative pendulum, 
the formation of works councils has been facilitated and their authority 
strengthened. The present paper outlines the terms of the new Works Constitution 
Reform Act and evaluates the case for it. First, we provide new information on the 
incidence and coverage of works councils. Second, we review the evidence on the 
effect of works councils on firm performance, focusing on some new results based 
on matched plant data. If the evidence on works council frequency points to a 
codetermination deficit, any such shortfall does not appear to have negative 
consequences for the workplace productivity, profitability, and employment. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Seit 1920 hat sich das Mitbestimmungsrecht in Deutschland 
mehrfach geändert. Die letzte Änderung brachte eine Erleichterung der Errichtung 
und eine Stärkung von Betriebsräten mit sich. Die vorliegende Arbeit skizziert die 
wichtigsten Bestimmungen des Betriebsverfassungs-Reformgesetzes und beurteilt 
dieses aus ökonomischer Sicht. Dabei liefern wir aktuelle Informationen über die 
Häufigkeit und die Deckungsrate von Betriebsräten und diskutieren die empirische 
Evidenz zu den Auswirkungen von Betriebsräten auf den Firmenerfolg, wobei wir 
uns auf neue Schätzergebnisse auf der Basis von Betriebsvergleichen stützen. 
Selbst wenn aufgrund der geringen Häufigkeit von Betriebsräten ein Mitbestim-
mungsdefizit konstatiert werden kann, scheint dieses keine negativen Auswirkun-
gen auf die betriebliche Produktivität, Profitabilität und Beschäftigung zu haben. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For many years the German system of codetermination has been regarded as 
exemplary, in much the same manner as that country’s system of apprenticeship 
training.
1  Indeed, with the precipitous decline in private-sector union density in 
many nations, the German system of worker participation has enjoyed further 
popularity as a potential solution to the problem of sub-optimal worker involvement 
hinted at by the facts of union decline. Even the United States has flirted with 
works councils on the German pattern.
2 More tangibly, the European Union has 
used the German institution as something of a template in designing various of its 
measures seeking to increase worker participation, the most recent example being 
legislation in March 2002 establishing a general framework for determining 
minimum information and consultation rights for workers at the workplace (Official 
Journal, 2002). 
 
If foreign observers have seen much to admire in the works council apparatus, 
their German counterparts have expressed concern with its operation. These 
concerns were rehearsed before a special Codetermination Commission/ 
Kommission Mitbestimmung, set up in 1996 by the Bertelsmann and Hans Böckler 
Foundations. The Commission reported in 1998. Its main conclusions were that 
codetermination at the establishment level was under-provided by the market 
despite the mandatory (but not automatic) status of works councils under law, and 
that changes needed to be made to the structure and mode of functioning of 
codetermination so as to defend its economic performance (Kommission 
Mitbestimmung, 1998). The deliberations of the Commission, coupled with strong 
demands from the union movement for reform, provided the basis for a new Works 
Constitution Act which entered into law in July 2001 and which increases the 
influence of the works council. 
 
In the present paper, we examine the most recent information from a nationally 
representative data set to determine whether the evidence on works council 
incidence and coverage is supportive of a codetermination ‘deficit.’ We further 
consider the likely economic consequences of the new legislation, drawing on an 
existing body of empirical research dealing with works council effects on firm 
                                            
1  In what follows, we restrict our attention to the codetermination at the workplace (betriebliche 
Mitbestimmung) and not that at the enterprise level through worker representation on company 
supervisory boards (Mitbestimmung auf Unternehmensebene). 
2  See, for example, the deliberations of the Dunlop Commission (1994).  4
performance.
  Given the statistical limitations of the extant literature, we seek to 
advance the debate on what works councils do by offering a new empirical analysis 
based on matched samples of establishments. Specifically, we examine the effects 
of works council formation on labor productivity, financial performance, and 
employment development. In this exercise we again use the most comprehensive 
data set available to researchers. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we sketch the backdrop to the revision 
of the Works Constitution Act. Second, we identify the principal changes introduced 
by the new law. Third, we address the perceived costs and benefits of these 
changes as they were expressed in the charged political debate surrounding the 
legislation. Fourth, we examine the pertinent facts on works council incidence and 
impact. An interpretative section linking our findings to the revised architecture of 
codetermination concludes. 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF WORKPLACE CODETERMINATION 
In Germany, the history of co-determination at the workplace dates back to World 
War I with the formation of workers’ committees (Arbeiterausschüsse) to mobilize 
union support for the war effort. Works councils per se were formally established 
shortly thereafter under the  Works Councils Law (Betriebsrätegesetz) of 1920.
 
Works councils and unions were abolished during the National Socialist era, and 
only reemerged during the occupation years – first on an ad hoc basis and then 
under laws passed by individual Länder. The procedures obtaining in the various 
regions of the country were consolidated under the 1952 Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). Because the national law gave fewer 
codetermination rights than the various state provisions that it replaced, and 
because works councils were now to be formally independent from as opposed to 
being subordinate to unions as under the 1920 legislation, the 1952 Act is often 
depicted as a defeat for labor. But further changes in the law occurred in 1972, 
some three years after the election of a coalition government of Social Democrats 
and Free Democrats. The new Works Constitution Act widened and strengthened 
the rights of works councils. Additionally, it improved the access of unions to the 
workplace and promoted collaboration between works councils and unions.
3 
 
                                            
3  A more detailed discussion of the evolution of the law is contained in Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner (2000a).  5 
The immediate backdrop to the most recent changes in the law
4 is provided by the 
deliberations of the Codetermination Commission and the debate pursuant to its 
conclusions. Among other things, the Commission was set up to evaluate 
experience with the workings of the 1972 Act. It comprised high-ranking 
representatives from the scientific, business, union and political communities, and 
was supported by specially-commissioned academic reports.
5 The Commission’s 
final report, entitled Co-Determination and New Business Cultures – Conclusion 
and Perspectives, was presented in May 1998
  (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 
1998).
6 It reasoned that it cannot be decided from either theory or the empirical 
evidence whether the overall effect of works councils is positive or negative: “In the 
real world codetermination as an institution generates both efficiency-reducing 
misallocation and efficiency-raising productivity and cooperative effects. The net 
impact of these parallel and simultaneous partial effects cannot be determined a 
priori” (English translation, para. 27; Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, paras. 
5.22-5.23, pp. 64-65). Although the Commission did not offer any concrete 
proposals for the reform of existing legislation, it emphasized the presence of a 
large and growing codetermination-free zone (see English translation, para. 19; 
Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, pp. 50-51). And it warned that: “A gradual 
erosion [of the institution of codetermination] cannot, in the public interest, be left to 
the vagaries of the market” (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, para. 6.16, p. 76). 
 
Contemporaneous with the publication of the final report of the Commission, the 
Federation of German Unions presented its own draft proposals for reform (see 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1998). The union demands were largely 
accommodated by the Social Democrat-Green coalition government, elected in the 
Fall of 1998. But although the new administration quickly announced its intention to 
reform and strengthen codetermination at the establishment level,
7 formulation of 
the controversial draft legislation was to be delayed for more than two years. The 
government’s bill was debated before the Committee for Labor and Social Order of 
the lower house on May 14, 2001. A slightly modified version of the bill was passed 
                                            
4  We here abstract from changes in the law implemented in 1989 (Gesetz zur Änderung des 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes über Sprecherausschüsse  der leitenden Angestellten und zur 
Sicherung der Montan-Mitbestimmung of December 1, 1998). This legislation established 
executive councils for senior executives and made provision for a modest extension of 
information and consultation rights for works councils proper in the event of changes in 
technology. 
5   See, for example, Streeck and Kluge (1999), and Frick, Kluge, and Streeck (1999). 
6    An English-language summary of the report can be downloaded at www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/endbericht/inhalt_e.html. 
7   See Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert, Koalitionsvereinbarung 
zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bonn, 20. 
Oktober 1998, Abschnitt I.8; www.bundesregierung.de:80/02/0203/020200/00.htm.  6
by the lower chamber on June 22, 2001, and approved by the upper house on July 
13, 2001. The Act became effective on July 28, 2001.
8 
 
3. CHANGES IN THE LAW 
The principal changes introduced under the Works Constitution Reform Act are as 
follows. First, the character of the works council becomes more diverse than 
heretofore. For example, divisional works councils can be introduced for special 
product or business units, or joint works councils can be set up across several 
establishments.
9  Second, in establishments employing between 5 and 50 
employees the voting procedure for setting up a works council is simplified. The 
streamlined procedure has two stages: the nomination of candidates by an 
electoral board (Wahlvorstand), followed one week later by another works meeting 
(Betriebsversammlung) in which the works council is elected directly in a secret 
ballot of all employees present. In larger establishments with 51 to 100 employees, 
the two sides can voluntarily decide to use the new simplified procedures. A related 
change is that in undertakings where there is a group-level works council 
(Konzernbetriebsrat) the latter body can directly set up an electoral committee to 
supervise the election of a works council in an establishment under a so-called 
“mentoring principle.” Third, the size of the works council is increased via a 
reduction in the employment thresholds used to determine the number of 
councilors. Table 1 compares the old and new regulations in this regard, showing 
for example that in establishments with 150 employees the size of the council is 
increased from 5 to 7 members, or roughly 5 percent of the workforce. Fourth, 
employers are now required to make provision for a full-time works councilor in 
establishments with 200 or more employees, instead of 300 employees as before. 
The employment thresholds for additional full-time councilors are also lowered. 
Table 2 contrasts the number of such paid full-time works councilors by 
establishment employment size threshold under the old and new legislation. 
(Provision is also made for these positions to be filled on a part-time basis by both 
regular and part-time workers.) 
 
                                            
8  There is as yet no official translation of the new law. The Works Constitution Reform Act is 
published in Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/5741 April 2, 2001. (This is 
available on the web at: www.bundestag.de.) The new Act is published in stand-alone form in 
the Federal Law Bulletin, Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl. I S. 1852. (This is again available on the web 
at: www.bma.bund.de/download/gesetze/BetrVG.pdf.). 
9  Where a company is restructured, the works council has a residual mandate for up to six 
months.  7 
Table 1 




  Works Constitution Act         Works Constitution Reform Act 
No. of employees    No. of works councilors   No. of employees   No. of works councilors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 5-20  1    5-20  1 
 21-50  3    21-50  3 
 51-150  5    51-100  5 
 151-300  7    101-200  7 
 301-600  9    201-400  9 
 601-1,000  11    401-700  11 
 1,001-2,000  15    701-1,000  13 
 2,001-3,000  19    1,001-1,500  15 
 3,001-4,000  23    1,501-2,000  17 
 4,001-5,000  27    2,001-2,500  19 
 5,001-7,000  29    2,501-3,000  21 
 7,001-9,000  31    3,001-3,500  23 
          3,501-4,000  25 
         4,001-4,500  27 
         4,501-5,000  29 
         5,001-6,000  31 
         6,001-7,000  33 
         7,001-9,000  35 
 
  In establishment with >9,000 employees the    Unchanged 
  number of councilors is increased by 2 
  members for each incremental 3,000 
 employees. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The establishment size intervals pertain to number of employees with voting 







Number of Works Council Members Released from Their Work Duties by 
Establishment Size, Pre-existing and Current Legislation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Works Constitution Act      Works Constitution Reform Act 
No. of employees  No. of paid, full-time    No. of employees       No. of paid, full-time 
      works councillors                 works councillors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 300-600  1  200-500  1 
 601-1,000  2  501-900  2 
 1,001-2,000  3  901-1,500  3 
 2,001-3,000  4  1,501-2,000  4 
 3,001-4,000  5  2,001-3,000  5 
 4,001-5,000  6  3,001-4,000  6 
 5,001-6,000  7  4,001-5,000  7 
 6,001-7,000  8  5,001-6,000  8 
 7,001-8,000  9  6,001-7,000  9 
 8,001-9,000  10  7,001-8,000  10 
 9,001-10,000  11  8,001-9,000  11 
     9,001-10,000  12 
 
 
  In establishments with >10,000 employees  Unchanged  
  one further member of the works council 
  is released for each incremental 2,000 
 employees. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The establishment size intervals refer to normal employment levels. 
 
 
Fifth, the influence of the works council in matters of employment protection and 
the training of the workforce is strengthened. The works council may now initiate 
and codetermine vocational training measures in respect of employees whose 
qualifications are likely to be rendered obsolete. Also, the works council is granted 
codetermination rights in the execution (although not the introduction) of 
teamworking arrangements. Sixth, the employer has to furnish the works council at 
his own expense with access to modern information and communications 
equipment, such as the internet and e-mail. Moreover, the works council is entitled  9 
to consult with internal and external experts, and can delegate some of its tasks to 
working groups in establishments with more than 100 employees. Seventh, an 
equality quota (Gleichstellungsquote) mandates that the gender which is in the 
minority at the establishment be represented on the works council at least in 
proportion to its employment share. Finally, the legislation cedes codetermination 
rights to the works council on environmental protection issues, and equips it with 
the means to combat racism in the workplace through an extension of its power to 
withhold consent in matters of the engagement and transfer of personnel. Where a 




Several of the above measures directly increase the likelihood of works council 
formation. Other of the measures that increase the competence or authority of the 
works council might also be expected to stimulate works council formation while 
also impacting firm performance and costs. Each theme is taken up in what 
follows. 
 
4. SOME GERMAN CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTROVERSIES  
Although there are no official statistics on the incidence of works councils, 
piecemeal evidence has indicated that their frequency is indeed modest among 
small and medium-sized workplaces – we provide definitive evidence of this, 
below. It was the growing importance of such establishments, especially in the 
service sector, that provided the basis of the Codetermination Commission’s 
diagnosis of a “codetermination-free zone.” For the Federal government this 
perceived participation gap was central to its reform of the Works Constitution Act. 
Yet it should be borne in mind that the size threshold for works council formation is 
just 5 employees (of whom 3 must be ‘eligible’ to be works councilors) and that 
employees alone decide whether or not they want a works council. Once the 
procedure is initiated by employees the election of a works council is to all intents 
and purposes automatic, in the past no less than today.  Nevertheless, in 
advocating a streamlining of the voting procedures in smaller establishments, 
                                            
10  Other provisions of the legislation include increased youth and trainee representation and the 
right of such groups to form their own committees in establishments with over 100 employees;  
the right of temporary agency workers to participate in works council elections in the companies 
to which they are assigned after three months’ service; and the requirement that the works 
council examine a specific issue raised from the shop floor where this is supported by at least 5 
percent of the workforce. On these and the above changes in the law, see BMA-Pressestelle 
(2001); www.bma.bund.de/presse.asp?id=1436.  10 
supporters of the legislation in part argued that the complexity of the electoral 
procedure dissuaded employees from setting the electoral process in motion 
and/or presented employers with the opportunity to delay matters and even to 
prevent the election of a works council (on which, see Schumacher and Böhmer, 
1995). 
 
In any event, the welfare consequences of incomplete works council coverage are 
unclear in general because of the two-faces of the entity, by analogy with the union 
institution (see Freeman and Medoff, 1984). On one side, the face of the works 
council is that of an instrument of collective voice. It provides workers with a means 
of expressing discontent other than through quits, implying reduced hiring and 
training costs and increased firm-specific investments. The works council also 
collects and aggregates information about the preferences of all workers, allowing 
management to select a more appropriate mix of compensation and personnel 
practices. Other things being equal, the creativity of consultation and the 
heightened job security stemming from codetermination should serve to further 
reinforce these pro-productive effects. But there is another side – a monopoly face 
– to consider. Thus, the power conveyed by knowledge and legal entitlement also 
allows the works council to delay and alter profit-maximizing decisions and to 
redistribute the joint surplus in favor of labor. If such actions also influence the 
decision to invest in physical and intangible capital, there can be dynamic as well 
as static inefficiencies. 
 
Expressed somewhat differently, the legal obligations imposed on the employer by 
the Works Constitution Act can complement market forces (specifically, reputation 
effects) by reinforcing the credibility of the employer’s commitment to take workers’ 
interests into account. While protecting workers’ reliance investments, the transfer 
of control rights to the worker side goes against the competitive grain. Within limits, 
however, worker rent seeking may be compatible with an increase in the joint 
surplus (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). The key is the availability of some device 
that can limit redistribution while preserving the potential efficiency gains from 
cooperation. Here, the German law may convey a decisive advantage and allow a 
partial decoupling of production from distribution issues. This is because of so-
called “peace obligation” of works councils (i.e. they cannot call strikes) and the 
dual industrial relations system in which the works council machinery is embedded 
(i.e. wages are typically determined not at the workplace but under industry-
wide/regional collective agreements). The fact that works councils cannot formally 
bargain over wages is not the end of the story since their codetermination and 
decision rights may afford numerous opportunities for extracting pecuniary and  11 
non-pecuniary concessions. Nevertheless, enough has been said to establish the 
crucially important German dimension to the broader debate over works councils. 
 
Apart from the aim of increasing works council penetration among small and 
medium-sized enterprises, it was a stated goal of the Federal government to 
increase the number of works councilors and to improve works council operation. 
To the latter end, as we have seen, the new regulations provide that works 
councils are to be equipped with information and communication equipment, to 
have improved access to internal and external experts, and the opportunity to 
delegate tasks to working groups. In addition, provision is made for the part-time 
release of works councilors and for more paid full-time works councilors. Each 
measure to a smaller or greater degree implies an increase in the costs of 
operating a works council. The costs have exclusively to be borne by employers. 
Mid-size establishments are likely to be most affected. For example, an 
establishment employing 200 employees now has for the first time to bear the 
costs of one paid full-time works councilor. This development alone represents an 
increase in its wage bill of one-half of one percent.  
 
The Federal government accepted that there were cost implications, noting in the 
preamble to its draft legislation of November 2000 that: “Democracy is not cost 
neutral. This principle also applies to democracy at the workplace and to the 
resulting system of establishment-level codetermination.” But it proceeded to argue 
that: “The benefit of an operational system of codetermination outweighs the 
additional expense.
11 Elaboration of this argument is contained in the justification 
for the actual legislation: “The additional costs to the establishment have to be set 
against the advantages from worker participation. Codetermination establishes 
trust. This trust facilitates flexible and process-open forms of cooperation and thus, 
for example, lowers transaction costs in the establishment. In addition, employees 
who know that their interests are represented in the firm and works councils that 
are able to incorporate these interests into the decision making process can 
increase the productivity of the undertaking and thence the competitiveness of the 




This line of official reasoning is notable in two respects. First, the language of the 
Codetermination Commission, on which the government draws, is in practice much 
                                            
11    Begründung zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes 
[Referentenentwurf] p. 23. 
12  Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/5741 of  2. 4. 2001, p. 32.  12 
more guarded. As we have seen, the Commission concedes that, at the theoretical 
level, it is not possible to determine a priori which of the works council’s two faces 
dominates. Second, as regards the facts of the matter, the Commission interprets 
the empirical evidence at that time as “equivocal.” (On each point, see Kommission 
Mitbestimmung, 1998, paras. 5.22, 5.14, pp. 61, 64.)  
 
But the stance of the opposition political parties, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, was 
scarcely more refined than that of the Federal government. In testimony before the 
Committee for Labor and Social Order of the German lower house, each focused 
exclusively on the costs side – occasioned by the increase in the number of regular 
and paid works councilors – and the implications for the competitiveness of and 
employment in small and medium-sized enterprise in particular.
13 Consonant with 
most other parliamentary testimony, pro and con, neither submission offered 
economic data or econometric evidence in support of its position.
14 
 
In what follows, we seek in some measure to fill this gap by surveying the 
econometric evidence on works council incidence and impact – much of which was 
available at the time of the Commission’s report – and to update this information 
with new findings from a nationally representative data set. The goal is to provide 
pointers as to the likely impact of the reforms as well as to chart the state of play in 
research into the economic effects of German works councils. 
 
5. WORKS COUNCIL PRESENCE AND IMPACT: A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Although research on works councils is limited there have been some major 
advances in recent years with the availability of new data sets. (The early literature 
was based on very small samples of firms that were investigated and 
                                            
13  In fact, the political opposition sought to roll back works council influence, not simply maintain 
the status quo ante. The CDU/CSU recommended that works councils should be set up in plants 
with less than 21 employees only if a majority of employees voted in favor, while the FDP argued 
that the number of works councilors should fall below the levels set under the previous 
legislation and that the threshold size for paid full-time councilors should be raised and their 
number reduced (see, respectively, Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
14/5753 of  3. 4. 2001, p.2; p. 3). 
14    See Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 14. Wahlperiode, 
Ausschussdrucksache 14/1512 of 10. 5. 2001 (which is available at the web site: 
www.bundestag.de). Notable exceptions to this statement are the contributions of the Society of 
Self-Employed Businesses (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Selbständiger Unternehmer), the Cologne 
Institute for Business Research (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln), and the Institute for 
Labor Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community (Institut für Arbeitsrecht und 
Arbeitsbeziehungen  in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft), which did refer to the econometric 
evidence; ibid., at respectively, pp. 133, 147, and 163.  13 
reinvestigated; for surveys of this literature, see Addison, Kraft, and Wagner, 1993; 
Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2000a). Here we propose to largely limit our 
review to studies using larger, more representative data sets because these enable 
us more effectively to address the key themes of works council incidence/coverage 
and works council impact along various dimensions of economic performance. 
 
Our starting point is works council incidence and coverage. As we have seen, the 
Codetermination Commission noted the (sharply increasing) presence of a 
“codetermination-free zone” in which there was neither board level nor works 
council codetermination. It reported that as of the mid-1990s this sector 
encompassed some 60.5 (45 percent) percent of all private sector (private and 
public sector) employees; corresponding values for 1984 were 50.6 (37.0) percent 
(Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 53-54). 
 
Despite the lack of official data, information from several sources confirm that large 
numbers of establishments and employees in the private sector do not have works 
councils.
15  In Table 3 we provide the most up-to-date and representative 
information on works council incidence and coverage by establishment size, using 
current data from the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit/Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor 
Office) Establishment Panel, described below. The data are for the private and 
public sectors combined and cover establishments with five or more employees 
(the minimum size of establishment that may elect a works council). They reveal a 
pattern of spotty works council incidence among smaller establishments and 
correspondingly low employment coverage. But the proportion of workplaces with 
works councils reaches a little over 50 percent (as does the share of employment 
represented by works council establishments) for plants with 51-100 employees. 
And works council incidence and coverage continues to increase in step with 
establishment size, although less so for eastern than for western Germany. In 
overall terms, works councils are encountered in just 16.3 percent of all German 
establishments with 5 or more employees, even if the share of employment 
accounted for by works council establishments is sharply higher than this (53 
percent). 
 
                                            
15  For information on works council frequency using data on approximately 1,000 manufacturing 
establishments in Lower Saxony (the data set is described below), see Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner (1997). Corresponding information for the German machine tool industry is provided by 
Funder and Seitz (1997) and Dilger (2002), and  results from a national employment-based 
survey of more than 1,500 manufacturing establishments in 1985 are contained in Frick and 
Sadowski (1995).  14 
Table 3 
Incidence and Coverage of Works Councils  in Germany in 2000 (in percent) 




c  Incidence Coverage Share  Incidence Coverage Share 
Size interval 
(no. of employees) 
5-20  9.3  10.5  25.7  7.8  9.8 27.8  9.1 10.4 26.0 
21-50  29.9  31.5  14.8  29.9 30.8 18.4  29.9 31.3 15.4 
51-100  52.9  53.4  11.4  51.2 51.3 13.1  52.6 53.0 11.7 
101-200  68.6  69.5  11.5  69.1 69.7 11.7  68.7 69.5 11.6 
201-500  81.4  82.6  14.1  76.2 77.4 12.8  80.6 81.8 13.9 
500>  93.3  93.5  22.5  82.1 86.3 16.2  91.7 92.6 21.4 
 
Average 16.6  54.1   15.4  47.1    16.3  53.0 
Notes: 
adenotes the proportion of establishments in the class interval having 
works councils,
b gives the proportion of employees in the class interval employed in 
firms with works councils, and 
c  represents the employment share of the class 
interval. All data are weighted. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2000. 
 
 
The direct association between works council coverage and establishment size can 
reasonably be linked to the potential influence of the works council. After all, 
participation rights increase with employment size not only with respect to number 
of (unpaid and full-time) works councilors, noted earlier, but also regarding the right 
to detailed information on personnel movements and notification of reductions in 
force (>20 employees), the establishment of an economics committee (>100 
employees), and the involvement of the works council in developing guidelines for 
criteria in personnel selection and movements (>1,000 employees). There are of 
course a variety of other employment size-related factors that may be at work here, 
including the public-goods aspects of many working conditions, monitoring 
considerations, internal labor market structuring and, less positively, worker 
dissatisfaction associated with routinized, regimented work settings. 
 
There have been a number of analyses seeking to identify the determinants of 
works council presence. Here we identify two such studies based on the Hannover 
Firm Panel. The population of this four-wave panel is all manufacturing firms with 
at least five employees in the Land of Lower Saxony. The sample of  15 
establishments is stratified by firm size, with over-sampling of larger firms. The first 
wave of the panel was completed in 1994 and contains information on 1,025 
establishments; with sample attrition, the sample size had fallen to 709 plants at 
the time of the final wave in 1997 (see Brand, Carstensen, Gerlach, and Klodt , 
1996). Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (1977) provide a multivariate regression 
analysis of the determinants of works council presence, using data from the first 
wave of the panel. In addition to structural variables (such as establishment size 
and age), the authors include several variables intended to capture a ‘taste for 
collective representation’ on the part of the workforce, such as the percentage of 
blue-collar, female, part-time, and shift workers. To test for some associations 
suggested by the earlier empirical literature, they also deploy a number of 
‘participation’ variables – in the form of dummies for teamworking and profit sharing 
– as well as the percentage of workers covered by incentive pay. Separate (probit) 
estimates are provided for all establishments and for a sub-sample of plants with 
10-249 employees (in which range between 10 percent and 84 percent of plants 
have works councils). 
 
Across both samples there is a consistent relation between the structural variables 
and work council presence. Thus, the probability of observing a works council 
increases with establishment size (albeit at a decreasing rate) and with the age of 
the plant, and is also greater if the establishment is a branch plant. As far as the 
taste for collective representation variables are concerned, these all behave in the 
anticipated manner but only the (inverse) relation between the female share of the 
workforce and works council presence is statistically significant across both 
samples. The effect of the participation variables is rather interesting. There is, for 
example, the suggestion that teamworking is associated with a reduced probability 
of observing a works council. (The same is true for employee profit sharing but in 
this case the coefficient estimate(s) is poorly determined.) This result is prima facie 
consistent with the managerial competence argument of FitzRoy and Kraft (1985, 
1987) that better managers can devise efficient communication and motivational 
alternatives to the impedimenta of a bureaucratized, time-consuming works council 
apparatus. 
 
In a more recent analysis, using pooled data from the 1994 and 1996 waves of the 
Hannover Firm Panel, Hübler and Jirjahn (2001) essentially confirm all (but one) of 
these results, including the negative association between teamworking and works 
council presence (but see below). In addition, they report that works councils are 
more likely in circumstances where employers provide further training, and where 
there are flexible working time arrangements, as might be explained by the specific  16 
role reserved for the works council in each area. On the other hand, the authors 
find that works councils are less likely to be encountered in plants making use of 
the newest production technology. In general, their results from this univariate 
probit exercise are replicated using a bivariate probit approach, accommodating 
simultaneous coverage or otherwise by a collective bargaining agreement. We will 
return to the issue of collective bargaining coverage when considering the econ-
omic impact of works councils, only noting here that data on union membership is 
too imprecise in this data set to allow serious investigation of the link between this 
other conventional measure of union influence and works council incidence. 
 
The bottom line is that the existing pattern of works council frequency seems to be 
fairly well explained by structural/organizational factors and elements associated 
with the specific functions of the works council. There is nothing to contradict the 
Codetermination Commission’s claim as to the extent and composition of the 
codetermination-free zone. The only fly in the ointment, as it were, is the finding 
that teamworking is negatively associated with the likelihood of observing a works 
council since this may suggest the availability of other methods of employee 
involvement that may substitute for the representative participation of the works 
council. Moreover, further analysis of the Hannover Panel also indicates that 
teamworking  is more than twice as likely to be practiced than representative 
participation through a works council (Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2000b). 
Are we to conclude from this that codetermination-free should not be equated with 
participation-free? Perhaps. But there are a number of grounds for caution in this 
regard. The first is that teamwork as defined in the survey – namely, “groups 
characterized by expanded involvement in decision making and increased 
responsibility” – is not a full functional alternative to a works council. Second, there 
must be some concern as to the national representativeness of the frequency of 
teamworking as revealed in what is after all a regional, manufacturing sample. 
Third, it may well be that that although works councils are negatively associated 
with teamworking they are nonetheless positively associated with other human 
resource practices such as training and group incentives that are complements to 
teamworking (see Jirjahn, 2002).
16  Finally, of course, there is no guarantee that 
either mechanism is optimally provided by the market. 
 
                                            
16   The evidence is decidedly mixed. For example, using the Hannover Panel, Schnabel and 
Wagner (2001) report that the presence of a works council is negatively related to teamworking 
and positively related to management consultation of the workforce. And for the German 
machine tool industry, Frick (2001a) reports that the extent of high performance work practices is 
higher in the absence of a works council (and, in their presence, where an existing works council 
behaves antagonistically).  17 
Putting aside for the moment these difficult interpretative issues, what evidence is 
there in the literature that a codetermination gap – as measured by works council 
absence – leads to a performance gap? The early literature documenting works 
council impact on establishment or firm performance is scarcely supportive of the 
German mandate. Practically every study points to adverse or at best statistically 
insignificant economic effects of the institution.
17 But if the early evidence was 
generally pessimistic – sometimes profoundly so – as regards works council 
impact, problems of small sample size dog the estimates. The samples of 
firms/workplaces never exceed 75 units, and the studies differ by sector, time 
interval, and outcome indicator. Accordingly, there is a very real issue as to the 
representativeness of their findings. Biases associated with the likely nonrandom 
distribution of works councils also cast a longer shadow in exercises of this 
nature.
18 Moreover, the studies typically do not venture beyond the deployment of a 
works council dummy variable to gauge the impact of the institution, although we 
know from industrial relations studies that the institution is unlikely to be a datum.
19 
 
Even before the Codetermination Commission had issued its report, however, 
results from a much larger dataset – the Hannover Firm Panel – had become 
available. Although problems of statistical inference still attach to estimates of 
works council impact derived from this data set (see below), the findings do raise 
some disturbing issues that might have been expected to have informed the public 
debate. Among other things, the new studies look to differences in works council 
impact by establishment size. This strategy seeks in part to address the dummy 
variable problem. But it is less a response to potential differences in works council 
type than it is a reflection of the common sense notion that the costs of operating a 
works council might be higher for smaller establishments and the benefits 
correspondingly smaller because of the availability of informal solutions. 
 
                                            
17   For evidence on total factor productivity, see the studies by FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) and 
Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993); on profitability, see FitzRoy and Kraft (1985), Addison, Kraft 
and Wagner (1993), and Addison and Wagner (1997); on investment in physical capital, see 
Addison, Kraft and Wagner (1993); and on investments in intangible capital, see FitzRoy and 
Kraft (1990), Schnabel and Wagner (1994), and Addison and Wagner (1997). Even in the case 
of labor turnover, Kraft (1986) reports that individual voice seemingly dominates collective voice 
(proxied by works council presence) as a means of lowering quits. 
18   But see the attempt to model works council endogeneity in FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) and 
Addison and Wagner (1997). In the case of the former study, however, note that the firms in the 
sample populated an association promoting employee ownership. 
19   Of the earlier studies, only Addison and Wagner (1997) offer a measure of the degree of 
participation or voice of the works council. More recently, analysts have exploited information 
from a question in the 1996 wave of the NIFA-Panel for the German machine-tool industry that 
asks the manager respondent to rate the relationship with the works council; see, for example, 
Frick (2001a) and Dilger (2002).  18 
In addition, to the extent that works council authority and bureaucratization are 
increasing in establishment size, there are grounds for expecting differences in 
impact at certain employment thresholds. For the very smallest firms with 5-20 
employees the constraint of a single works councilor may pose few difficulties, 
whereas in firms with 21-100 employees the growth in the number of councilors (3 
up to 50 employees, 5 thereafter) and the requirement that the works council 
receive detailed information on personnel movements (plus documentation) as well 
as notification of reductions in force may be a real constraint. Of course, the rights 
of the works council increase further as establishment size climbs above 100 
employees, beginning with the establishment of an economics committee (>100 
employees), continuing with the appointment of full-time works councilors (at 300 
[now 200] employees), through to the development of guidelines for criteria in 
personnel selection and movements (>1,000 employees). Indeed, the biggest 
extension of codetermination authority may accompany parity worker 
representation on company boards, although the complication here is that 
practically all establishments in the sample have works councils well before this 
particular size threshold (>2,000 employees) is reached. 
 
There are, then, grounds for examining differences in works council effect by 
establishment size. Table 4 provides summary results by three employment size 
intervals for six outcome indicators, again using the first wave of the Hannover 
panel. The regressions from which these estimates of works council effect are 
derived contain a large number of control variables, and are available from the 
authors on request. Published variants are contained in Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner (1998, 1999, 2000b, 2001).
20 
 
Consistent with the early literature the table contains results for labor productivity 
and profitability, adding findings for wages and employment. Beginning with labor 
productivity (measured as value added per worker), there is no indication among 
small and medium-sized plants that productivity is higher in works council regimes. 
(In this sample, 98 percent of establishments with 5-20 employees do not have a 
work council, as compared with 48 percent of plants with 21-100 employees.). As 
is evident, pro-productive effects are restricted to establishments with more than 
100 employees (only 9 percent of which do not have works councils). On this 
evidence there is no disadvantage attaching to the absence of representative 
participation in the large majority of establishments. 
 
                                            
20  See also the studies by Jirjahn (1998) and Hübler and Jirjahn (2001), who do not differentiate by 
establishment size, and Jirjahn (2002) who does.  19 
Table 4 




Indicator     Estimation      Establishment  size  interval 
      procedure    5-20    21-100    >100 
 
Labor  productivity   OLS     none    none        positive* 
 
Profitability     Ordered  probit   negative**   negative**   none 
 
Wages      OLS     none    positive**   none 
 
Hires      OLS     none    none    negative* 
 
Departures     OLS     none    none    none 
 
Labor  fluctuation   OLS     none    none    none 
 
Notes: 
a Details of the regressions are available from the authors on request. 
Published results for all establishments and the 21-100 employee sub-sample are 
given in Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (1998). **, * denote statistical significance 
at the .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
Source: Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (2000b). 
 
 
For its part, profitability is distinctly lower in small and medium-sized 
establishments.
21 (The profitability variable is subjective and is expressed in index 
form according to management's assessment of establishment earnings – where 1 
is “very bad” and 5 denotes “very good”). At issue is the mechanism producing this 
result. The information in the third row of the table hints that rent-seeking in the 
form of higher wages might be the culprit, but not only are the (three performance) 
measures not commensurate but there are few indications of why this might be 
more pronounced in medium-sized than in larger-scale plants, although it might be 
the case that in larger plants more of the wage is taken out in fringes.
22 
                                            
21  Dilger (2002) also identifies profitability-reducing effects of works councils in the NIFA-Panel. 
22   For the most thorough examination to date of the routes through which the remuneration 
package may be enhanced, see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (2001).  20 
The results for several measures of labor turnover contained in the next three rows 
of the table are notable for their general statistical insignificance. With the 
exception of the finding of reduced hires in larger plants with works councils (which 
may of course flag ‘insider’ behavior), there is no suggestion that works council 
presence is associated with reduced turnover either in terms of quits or gross flows 
as might be suggested by collective voice considerations. That said, quits are 




On balance, this evidence is by no means as prejudicial to works councils as that 
reported in the earlier econometric literature.
24 By the same token, there is nothing 
in the data to suggest that smaller establishments suffer practically from a 
codetermination deficit and some evidence that they may be at a disadvantage 
from having a works council. In short, the economic  justification for stimulating 
works council formation through legislation is unclear for the majority of 
workplaces, although for larger establishments it may well be the case that 
legislation is not a constraint or even in accord with their organizational needs. 
 
Abstracting from further refinements that can be made to the underlying model – 
examples would include the incorporation of collective bargaining agreements and 
high performance work practices
25 – there remain problems of statistical inference 
attaching to all cross-section estimates of this type despite the improvement in 
                                            
23  In contrast, Frick (1997) reports that the presence of a works council serves to reduce quits, 
whereas the frequency of hiring is in general found to be unaffected (see also Frick and 
Sadowski, 1995). Dilger (2002) also finds that works council presence is associated with 
significant reductions in several measures of labor turnover. 
24  In a production function study using the 1998 wave of the IAB Establishment Panel (see the next 
section), Frick (2001b) obtains more positive evidence, although he does not differentiate by 
establishment size. Specifically, he finds that works council presence is associated with 25 (30) 
percent higher labor productivity in western (eastern) Germany. These huge point estimates may 
reflect omitted variables bias and an inadequate measure of capital (proxied by the log of 
replacement investment). Using the same data set and applying first differences, we were 
unable to replicate this result – the results are available on request. Similarly, using a stochastic 
production frontier approach, Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2002) fail to detect material 
differences in establishment efficiency by works council status. 
25   Thus, Hübler and Jirjahn (2001) have argued that where the establishment is covered by 
collective agreement this will serve to dissipate distributional conflict at the workplace and at the 
same time amplify any pro-productivity effect of the works council. (Recall that works council 
presence and collective bargaining coverage are endogenous in the empirical model and 
handled via a double-selection methodology.) The authors’ results point to higher productivity in 
works council regimes but only where the establishment is covered by a collective agreement. 
That said, wages appear to be higher under works councils irrespective of whether or not the 
plant follows a collective agreement. For its part, German work on high performance work 
practices is in its infancy and pending analysis of what bundles belong together and their impact 
on productivity it is perhaps overambitious to anticipate a consistent association between works 
councils and any single practice.  21 
establishment and industry controls. Moreover, there are major difficulties in 
exploiting the longitudinal capacity of the dataset in question and hence in 
controlling for firm heterogeneity. In the Hannover Firm Panel only a very small 
number of plants record a change in works council status (i.e. the introduction or 
abolition of a council), so that a fixed effects model cannot be used to investigate 
works council impact while controlling for time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity.
26 Arguably, such concern with econometric issues (rather than 
cursory examination of the empirical evidence) weighed heavily on the 
Codetermination Commission, leading it to adopt its agnostic position on the 
efficiency consequences of workplace codetermination. Be that as it may, in what 
follows we present new results using an improved methodology that addresses 
some of these concerns. 
 
6. WORKS COUNCIL FORMATION AND PLANT PERFORMANCE: NEW EVIDENCE 
FROM THE IAB ESTABLISHMENT PANEL 
Our survey of the extant empirical evidence has revealed that most of what we 
know of works councils’ impact on firm performance has a basis in cross-section 
data. In an attempt to get a firmer grip on the causal effects of works councils, we 
now deploy an alternative empirical strategy. The idea is to look at the effects of 
works council formation (rather than presence) on firm performance in the years 
after a works council has been formed by comparing establishments introducing 
works councils with matched establishments that have continued to operate 
without them. Here we will be using changes data, which might be expected to 
exacerbate measurement error. In the case of works council formation, however, 
we would argue that the discrete nature of the event and the fact that it is not a 
business secret means there is little risk the event will go unreported. 
 
Our empirical strategy can only be undertaken using a data source that covers a 
large number of establishments over several years, with corresponding information 
on works council status and several indicators of firm performance. To the best of 
our knowledge there is only one longitudinal data set in Germany that fulfils these 
rather demanding requirements. This is the IAB Establishment Panel of the Insti-
tute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor Service that we used earlier to 
                                            
26  The use of a random effects approach is also contraindicated because such effects have to be 
uncorrelated with the variables included in the performance equation, and it is hard to argue that 
any unobserved plant characteristic (e.g. management quality) is uncorrelated with observables 
such as plant size or innovativeness used to explain, say, profitability or growth outcomes.  22 
provide descriptive information on works council incidence and coverage (see 
Table 3). 
 
Each year since 1993 (1996), the IAB Panel has surveyed several thousand 
establishments from all sectors of the economy in western (eastern) Germany. It is 
based on a stratified random sample – strata for 16 industries and 10 size classes 
– from the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by 
social insurance. To correct for panel mortality, exits, and newly-founded units, the 
data are augmented regularly, producing an unbalanced panel. Participation of 
establishments is voluntary, but the response rates (which exceed 70 %) are high 
compared with other non-official German firm panel studies. Data are collected in 
personal interviews with the owners or senior managers of the establishments by 
professional interviewers. The panel is created to serve the needs of the Federal 
Labor Service, and so its focus is on employment related matters (Kölling, 2000).
  
 
Information on the works council status of establishments in western and eastern 
Germany is available for the 1996, 1998, and 2000 waves of the panel. In order to 
investigate the impact of works council formation, as a first step we identified all 
those establishments without a works council in 1996. (We excluded 
establishments in the non-profit sector and also those from banking and insurance 
because they do not report sales turnover, our proxy for labor productivity.) Plants 
subsequently reporting they had a works council 1998 that was still operational in 
2000 form our group of ‘treated’ establishments. Establishments without a council 
over the entire sample period, 1996 to 2000, form our ‘control’ group. The former 
group comprises 31 establishments. Average employment in this group was 79.9 
employees in June 1996 (the range being from 2 to 695 employees). Just one 
establishment had more than 300 employees, and only four had between 100 and 
300 employees. Clearly, then, the large majority of plants introducing works 
councils are small.
 The control group contains 1,513 establishments. 
 
There are some marked differences between the treated and the control group in 
1996 when neither had works councils. Table 5 examines these differences for 
several workplace characteristics that have been found to be associated with 
works council presence. Thus, for example, it can be seen that establishments 
introducing a works council initially had a higher number of employees. This result 
is consistent with the view that employees in larger establishments are more likely 
to elect a works council because participation rights increase with establishment 
size. Plants introducing councils also have, on average, higher shares of both blue-
collar and shift workers and a lower proportion of female employees. As noted  23 
earlier, these associations probably reflect different ‘tastes’ for collective 
representation among workers, as well as the special rights of works councils (e.g. 
in matters concerning the regulation of working time). Each of these differences in 
mean values is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level or better. 
Furthermore, 16 percent of establishments introducing a works council, but only 8 
percent of other establishments, were branch plants. This difference would be 
consistent with a demonstration effect emanating from the mother plants to its 
affiliate, but on this occasion the difference in means is not statistically significant 
at conventional levels. Finally, the profit situation
 in the two groups also does not 








  Establishments   Establishments      Prob-value for H0: 
  introducing  not introducing      diff. of means = 0
b   
  a works council  a works council 
Variable   (n = 31)  (n = 1,513) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Number of employees   79.90  34.48      0.066 
Branch plant (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.16  0.08      0.261 
Share of blue-collar workers (percent) 62.55  51.11      0.100 
Share of shift workers (percent) 22.16  7.76      0.037 
Share of part-time employees (percent) 14.86  14.80     0.990 
Share of female employees (percent)   30.62  40.12      0.073 
Profit situation   0.42  0.33      0.337 
(dummy: 1 = 'very good,' 'good') 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
aData are for 1996 when establishments from both groups did not have a 
works council. 
bTwo-sample t-test with unequal variances. 
Source: Authors' own calculations from the IAB Establishment Panel. 
                                            
27  The IAB Establishment Panel contains a subjective measure of profitability according to a five-
point scale ranging from very good to very bad (using the grades common in German schools, 
namely, sehr gut, gut, befriedigend, ausreichend, and mangelhaft). The profit measure used in 
Tables 5 and 6 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for establishments reporting a 
very good or good profit situation, zero otherwise.  24 
The implication of the material in Table 5 is that the introduction of a works council 
is not a random occurrence. The different ‘starting conditions’ imply that observed 
differences over the sample period in the performance of establishments that did or 
did not introduce a works council cannot unambiguously be interpreted as a causal 
effect of that entity. If establishments from both groups differ significantly at a point 
in time when none of them (yet) had a works council, one would expect them also 
to display differences some years later. This conclusion applies equally to those 
plants in which a works council was set up had the event not taken place. In short, 
we have no information on the counterfactual, namely, what would have happened 
in our 31 establishments had they not experienced the formation of a works 
council. In sum, we cannot be sure that observed differences in performance 
between plants that introduced a works council vis-à-vis those that did not are 
caused by a works council. 
 
This problem closely resembles that encountered in, say, the evaluation of active 
labor market programs. If participants, or treated units, are not selected randomly 
from a population but are instead selected (or self-select) according to certain 
criteria, the effect of a treatment cannot be evaluated by comparing the average 
performance of the treated and the non-treated. Given that each unit 
(establishment, person, etc.) either participated or not, we have no information 
about its performance in the counterfactual situation. A promising solution is to 
select from the control group a sub-sample of units in such a way that every 
treated unit is matched to an untreated unit that is as similar as possible (ideally, 
identical) at a point prior to the treatment. Differences between the two groups (the 
treated and the matched non-treated) after the treatment can then with more 
assurance be attributed to the treatment (see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 
1999). 
 
To repeat, in our empirical investigation the treated group consists of the 31 
establishments that introduced a works council in 1998.  For each of these firms 
we then searched for the most similar establishment from the universe of 1,513 
establishments without a works council between 1996 and 2000. That is, we 
looked for a firm with the same (or very similar) number of employees, branch-plant 
status, share of blue-collar, shift, part-time and female workers, profit situation, 
region (western or eastern Germany), and industry affiliation. Technically this was 
achieved by first computing the so-called propensity score. This score is computed 
from a probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether or not an 
establishment introduced a works council in 1998 on all the relevant establishment 
characteristics mentioned above (as measured in 1996). A vector of variables was  25 
then assembled for each establishment consisting of the value of its propensity 
score, the number of its employees in 1996, and the location dummy for 
western/eastern Germany. (The motivation for including two variables that already 
appear in the score explicitly in the matching is that they are potentially highly 
correlated with the outcome variables – but not influenced by them – as well as 
with selection; on which, see Lechner, 2002). Finally, for each of the 31 
establishments that introduced a works council, the most similar non-introducing 
plant – specifically, that establishment with the vector exhibiting the minimum 
Mahalanobis distance from the vector of the introducing establishment – was 
selected and matched to this unit.
28 (Note that in this process each ‘control’ (i.e. 
member of the initial control group) is never used more than once to form a twin, so 
that the results reported below are based on 31 totally different pairs of treated and 
non-treated plants.) These matched non-treated establishments now form the 
control group used in our subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
Table 6 indicates that the matching was successful. A comparison of the mean 
values of variables in 1996 for the two matched sets of plants – those that 
subsequently introduced a works council and those that did not – shows no 
statistically significant differences at conventional levels. In other words, both 
groups of establishments are very similar. Causal effects of introducing a works 
council can now be identified with more confidence by comparing the mean values 
of a number of performance indicators for the two samples. We shall focus on four 
performance indicators, measured in change form over the entire sample period.
 
 
Prior to introducing these variables, however, we return to the point that matching 
on observables does not solve all problems. Absent very rich data, the 
establishments in which works councils are set up could be ‘odd men out’ in some 
unidentified ways. For example, might not ‘rich’ firms adopt works councils to share 
their bounty or, alternatively, might not ‘troubled’ firms adopt them as a quid pro 
quo for concessions elsewhere. If so, our approach could still suffer from the 
standard selection problems. By way of response, we note that two variables 
                                            
28  The calculation of the Mahalanobis distance (MD) is as follows. Let x
a and x
b be the column 
vector of matching variables for plants with and without a newly-established works council. Let G 
be the inverse of the covariance matrix. The Mahalanobis distance (MD) is then 





This is a weighted sum of the squared differences of the variables, where the weights – taken 
from the  covariance matrix – take into account the different dimensions of measurement of the 
elements in the vector of matching variables (namely, propensity score, number of employees, 
and the location dummy). For a theoretical discussion of the propensity-score-based 
Mahalanobis distance matching technique, see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). Matching was 
performed in Stata 7.0 using the PSMATCH command (Sianesi 2001).  26 
included in the underlying probit – the initial profit situation and industry affiliation of 
establishments – capture in a rough and ready way some such aspects of firm 
heterogeneity. It is also important to recognize that works councils are elected by 
workers rather than adopted by firms, even if the (unmodeled) resistance of 
management may be expected to mediate the outcome. 
 
Table 6 




  Establishments  Matched establishments  Prob-value for H0: 
  introducing  not introducing   diff. of means = 0
b 
  a works council  a works council 
Variable  (n = 31)  (n = 31) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Number of employees  79.90  75.75  0.893 
 
Branch plant (dummy: 1 = yes) 0.16  0.06    0.236 
 
Share of blue-collar  
workers (percent) 62.55    56.92    0.524 
 
Share of shift workers (percent) 22.16   24.39   0.809 
 
Share of part-time  
employees (percent)  14.86  11.40  0.547    
 
Share of female  
employees (percent) 30.62    37.60    0.337 
 
Profit situation  0.42    0.52    0.453 




aData are for 1996 when establishments in both groups did not have a 
works council. Matching was achieved using the  propensity score plus the number 
of employees in 1996 and a dummy for eastern/western Germany using the 
PSMATCH procedure written by Barbara Sinesi (2001) for use with Stata 7.       
bTwo-sample t-test with unequal variances. 
Source: Authors' own calculations from the IAB Establishment Panel. 
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With these preliminaries behind us, we next consider the four outcome variables 
used in this inquiry: the change in the quit rate; the growth in labor productivity; 
establishment growth; and the change in the profit situation. The change in the quit 
rate is measured by the percentage point difference in the share of employees who 
voluntarily separated from their establishments in 1996 and 2000. Collective voice 
considerations and works councils’ governance attributes might suggest that the 
quits of dissatisfied employees should be reduced (and transformed into voice) 
after the formation of a works council. The growth in labor productivity is proxied by 
the percentage change in sales per employee over the same period. We used 
turnover rather than the more conventional value added measure because the data 
set had a large number of missing values for purchases of intermediate products – 
a crucially important consideration given the small number of plants introducing 
works councils. (As a practical matter, however, the course of turnover and value 
added per employee is strongly positively correlated, 1996-2000.) Both the broad 
collective voice model and the works council-specific of Freeman and Lazear 
(1995) would point to productivity increases due to enhanced cooperation in the 
wake of works council introduction. As we have seen, this very argument was used 
by the Federal government in justification of its reform proposals. Turning to 
establishment growth, this variable is simply measured by the percentage change 
in the level of employment. If the introduction of a works council is generally 
beneficial, as claimed by the German authorities, then other things being equal the 
plant should prosper and grow faster than other firms. If, however, works councils 
are downright injurious or if they pursue an insider-oriented policy, employment 
growth would be dampened or even reversed. Finally, the change in the profit 
situation is indicated by a dummy variable that assumes a value of one in the case 
of a reduction in profitability between 1996 and 2000, zero otherwise. If the far-
reaching rights of the works council are deployed for rent-seeking purposes, or if 
the operation of a works council is relatively expensive, establishment profits can 
be expected to fall following its formation. 
 
Mean values of each of these performance indicators for the two types of plant are 
reported in the first two columns of Table 7.
29  The probability values cited in the 
next column indicate in all cases that the null-hypothesis of no difference in means 
cannot be rejected, assuming a normal distribution. Since outliers can be 
important, especially with only 31 pairs of observations, we also tested for 
differences in means using the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The results of this 
nonparametric test are provided in the final column of the table. They are again 
                                            
29  Because of missing data on sales and the quit rate these two performance indicators could not 
be computed for all plants. Accordingly, the number of cases used in the calculations differ.  28 
supportive of the null hypothesis of there being no differences in means as 
between the treatment group and the controls. (The one possible exception is the 
productivity measure where the difference – in favour of the former – is now weakly 
significant.) Overall, then, the suggestion is that the introduction of a works council 
does not appear to have a causal effect on the mainstream indicators of firm 
performance considered here. The caveat in all of this is sample size: the small 
number of matched pairs clearly increases the difficulty of finding statistically 
significant differences in performance outcome between the two samples. 
 
Table 7 
Mean Values of Performance Indicators in Establishments Introducing/Not Introducing a 
Works Council, Matched Establishments
a 
__________________________________________________________________ 
                Establishments      Matched establishments     Prob-value for H0:     Prob-value for 
                 introducing        not introducing       diff. of means =0
b      Wilcoxon test 
                 a works council      a works council 
Performance indicator 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Change in quit rate    1.09      -0.05    0.4109    0.6699 
(percentage points)   (n=30)   (n=30) 
 
Growth in sales per    32.56      8.87    0.1865    0.0980 
employee (percent)   (n=25)    (n=25) 
 
Growth in number of    6.83    16.81    0.4087    0.3320 
employees (percent)   (n=31)    (n=31) 
 
Change in profit  
situation    0.35      0.26    0.4169   0.7963 
(dummy: 1 = deterioration) (n=31)  (n=31)   
__________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
aData are for 2000 compared with 1996 when establishments from both groups did 
not have a works council.  Matching was achieved using the propensity score plus the 
number of employees in 1996 and a dummy for eastern/western Germany using the 
PSMATCH procedure written by Barbara Sianesi (2001) for use with Stata 7. 
bTwo-sample 
t-test with unequal variances. 
Source: Authors' own calculations from the IAB Establishment Panel. 
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More generally, although the failure to report any differences may look 
disappointing, recall that the proponents of the new law have argued that 
substantial benefits will accrue from increasing works council penetration among 
smaller firms. We do not find any empirical evidence in favor of this proposition in 
our analysis of matched samples of what are mostly small firms. In particular, 
neither labor turnover nor labor productivity seems to be improved by works council 
formation. Furthermore, these two results have to be seen against the backdrop of 
the administrative costs of setting up and running a works council. To be fair, these 
costs have not manifested themselves in statistically significant changes in 
financial performance, although they may have been too small to be reflected in 
our rather blunt profitability measure. In any event, we see nothing in our results to 
support the German government’s assertion that “[t]he benefit of an operational 




The Works Constitution Act has once again been overhauled. The changes 
introduced are designed to make works council formation easier and to stiffen 
codetermination through more permanent works councilors and enhanced works 
council authority. The changes in the law follow on the heels of the report of a high-
level commission of inquiry into the functioning of the German codetermination 
system. Although this Kommission Mitbestimmung,  or Codetermination 
Commisssion, eschewed making specific legal recommendations and accepted 
that the economic impact of the institution was ambiguous, it nevertheless chose to 
emphasize the existence of a codetermination gap and further argued that the 
provision of worker representation could not be left to the vagaries of the market. 
 
The goal of the present treatment has been threefold: first, to describe the 
background to and nature of the legislative changes; second, to link the legislation 
to what we know of the economic impact of works councils; and, third, to offer a 
new test procedure in an attempt to  tackle some of the problems encountered in 
the empirical literature. In the first context, we had no difficulty in demonstrating the 
tenuous nature of the link between economic analysis and policy formation – 
irrespective of the political complexion of the policy maker. Using nationally 
representative data, we were also able to confirm the existence of a large 
codetermination-free zone. Almost all small establishments and one-half of 
                                            
30  See note 11 supra.  30 
medium-sized plants have no works council and as a result no formal vehicle for 
codetermination. Less clear, however, is whether this description should be taken 
to imply an equivalent absence of participation. Frankly, our understanding of the 
degree of substitutability or complementarity between works councils and other 
participation measures is too rudimentary to form a judgment on this important 
issue.  
 
Second, we interpreted the existing empirical evidence rather differently than did 
the Commission. Given that the costs of operating a works council are likely to be 
greater for smaller establishments, where works council coverage is currently 
patchy at best, we find it interesting that the Commission failed to report that it is 
precisely among such establishments that the evidence is least favorable to works 
councils. For their part, larger plants seemingly find works councils less of a 
constraint. In general the economic justification for works council legislation is 
weak, although we had occasion to mention some recent research suggesting that 
the policing role of the industry-wide collective agreement might allow the pro-
productive potential of the works council to be realized by ensuring a partial 
decoupling of production from distribution issues. 
 
Third, in recognition of the limitations of the existing literature, we provided some 
brand new evidence on the effects of works council formation on establishment 
performance, using longitudinal data from the IAB Establishment Panel for 1996-
2000. Our approach was to control for selection using matched samples of plants 
that did and did not introduce works councils.   The upshot of this nonparametric 
test procedure was that although there were some large differences in the means 
of the change variables for the two types of plants, none was statistically significant 
at conventional levels. In short, we were unable to reject the null that the 
introduction of a works council had no effect on any of the measures of 
establishment performance examined. Although these results are at odds with the 
earlier, cross-section evidence to the extent that the sample of plants introducing 
works councils were predominantly small establishments with less than 100 
employees, they are also quite contrary to the strong null that is the Federal 
government’s position. 
 
Given the small sample of establishments and the relatively short time frame 
examined we must be cautious in applying our findings to the regime shift. But it is 
not clear that works councils to be established in the wake of the Works 
Constitution Reform Act should be any more pro-productive than the cases we 
have examined. Indeed, the greater facility in setting up works councils and the  31 
enhanced authority of the institution might hint at less favorable outcomes. But the 
simple facts are that we do not know and in the absence of data permitting a 
natural experiment we are unlikely to be able to quantify the effects of the 
legislation with any precision. However, the growth in works councils can be 
monitored and establishment behavior tracked over succeeding waves of the IAB 
panel with a view to detecting structural breaks in key performance indicators. We 
would argue that recent EU legislation on national systems for informing and 
consulting workers serves to reinforce the importance of this follow-up inquiry. 
 
One final observation is in order. As we have noted, the Codetermination 
Commission did not actually call for legal action, instead preferring a subtle mix of 
self-regulation at the firm and establishment level together with action on the part 
of the social partners (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, pp. 113-120). It further 
recommended that the special requirements of small and medium-sized firms 
should be taken into account by allowing them greater flexibility to tailor their 
codetermination regime to their specific needs. None of this was taken up by the 
government in framing the new law. There is a certain irony in the outcome of 
events, but the Commission can scarcely be surprised by the bluntness of 
legislative regulation given its diagnosis of a “codetermination-free zone” and 
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